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The Present Status of the "Clear and
Present Danger Test"-- A Brief
History and Some Observations
By Louis B. LUSK*
"And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play
upon the earth, so truth be in the field, we do injuriously by
licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her
and falsehood grapple; who ever knew truth put to the
worse, in a free and open encounter?"
AREOPAGITCA

Free speech under the Constitution does not mean unlimited
license to say whatever a person pleases whenever and wherever
he pleases to say it. Freedom must walk hand in hand with
restraint. But how much freedom and how much restraint?
The "clear and present danger" test was an attempt on the
part of the Supreme Court to answer this fundamental question,
an effort to reconcile freedom with restraint. What is the present
status of that test? A brief history of its orgin and development
may help us to determine that status.
I. THE BIRTH OF THE TEST AND WHAT IT MEANT
TO ITS FORMULATORS
The declaration of war against Germany in April 1917 and
the passage by Congress of the conscription act in May fired up
Charlie Schenck and his fellow Socialists. The war and conscription were brutal sacrifices of working-class lives for the benefit of
the wealthy. A "Wall Street War." That was why Charlie, general secretary of the Socialist Party and in charge of the Socialist
* A.B. 1954, LL.B. 1956, University of Alabama. Graduate Fellow, Yale
Law School, 1956-1957. Attorney at law, Guntersville, Ala.
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headquarters in Philadelphia, was preparing one hot day in
August to mail another batch of anti-conscription circulars to
draftees. The circulars certainly expressed Charlie's feelings. In
impassioned language they charged that conscription was despotism in its worst form and a monstrous wrong against humanity
in the interests of Wall Street's chosen few, that the conscripts
had a right to assert their opposition to the draft, and in bold
print urged the conscripts to "Assert Your Rights."
Charlie and a fellow worker were indicted and convicted of
a conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917, by attempting
to cause insubordination in the armed forces and to obstruct
recruiting.
The conviction was taken to the Supreme Court for review.
There the defendants contended that the right to make the utterances contained in the circulars was protected from federal
abridgment by the First Amendment.
Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
1
the speech, or of the press ....
Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court, did not phrase
the problem in terms of whether the Espionage Act itself was
constitutional. He seemed to assume its constitutionality.2 For
Holmes the problems were whether the statute could be applied
so as to abridge speech and, if so, what were the constitutional
limits of abridgment. It was in answer to these problems that he
said:
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the
defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would
have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which
it is done... The most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre
and causing a panic . . . The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity
and degree. When a nation is at war many things that
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its
I U.S. Const. Amend. I.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, at 52 ff. (1919).

2
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effort that their utterances will not be endured so long as
men fight and that no court could regard them as protected
by any constitutional right. .. 3
Thus was born the "clear and present danger" test.
But just what were the significance and meaning of this new
test? Would it be applied in future cases? And if so, in what
kinds of cases? When would a danger be "present" within the
meaning of the test? What did "clear" mean? What were these
"substantive evils" the clear and present danger of which would
justify abridgment of speech? Are there not a multitude of evils
which "Congress has a right to prevent"? Would any such evil
justify the repression of speech if there were a "clear and present
danger" that the speech would bring it about? More would have
to be said before the full meaning of the test could be known.
Holmes probably did not immediately perceive the potential
significance of the phrase he had conceived, 4 for he did not
employ the phrase in the next two cases 5 to come before the Court
involving the limits of free speech, although he wrote the opinion
in both instances.6
In the first of these cases, Frowerk v. United States,7 the defendant had published in St. Louis during the war a newspaper
in which conscription was denounced and the war condemned as
an effort to protect the interests of Wall Street. In upholding the
defendant's conviction under the Espionage Act, Justice Holmes
did not mention the clear and present danger test nor analyze the
case in terms of it. The Schenck case was cited but only in reaffirming the principle there set out that freedom of speech is not
absolute."
The second decision, Debs v. United States,9 sustained the
conviction of Eugene V. Debs, without doubt the most famous
3 Ibid., at 52.

4 "There was a lot of jaw about free speech, which I dealt with somewhat
...2 Holmes-Pollock
summarily in an earlier case-Schenck v. United States.
Letters 7 (Howe ed. 1941). But see Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, at
86 (1948), where the author suggests that Holmes joined with the majority and
wrote the opion so that he could later claim that clear and present danger test
the unanimous endorsement of the Court.
had received
5
Frowerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249

U.S. 211 (1919).

6 But see Cushman, "Clear and Present Danger" in Free Speech Cases: A
Study in Judicial Semantics, in Essays in Political Theory, at 314 (1948) : "He aTplied the test in the other two cases (i.e., Frowerk and Debs) without calling it y
name.

7 249 U.S. 204 (1919).

8 Ibid., at 206.

9 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
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person imprisoned under the Espionage Act. Debs made the
mistake of delivering a speech at Canton, Ohio, in June 1918,
extolling socialism, denouncing war as the supreme curse of capitalism, and praising certain persons convicted of obstructing the
draft.'" Here again, however, Justice Holmes made no reference
whatever to the phrase "clear and present danger"; indeed, this
time he did not even cite the Schenck case.
Eight months later, however, the apparently forgotten phrase
reappears in a strong dissenting opinion by Justice Holmes in
Abrans v. United States." "In the early morning of August 28,
1918, loiterers at the corner of Houston and Crosby streets in
New York City were surprised to see the air full of leaflets thrown
from a window of a manufacturing building close by.", " In
abusive language the leaflets called President Wilson a coward
for sending American troops "to crush the Russian Revolution,"
urged the "workers of the world" to "awake," to stop producing
munitions to murder "your dearest, best, who are in Russia and
are fighting for freedom." Russian-born Jacob Abrams, who had
printed the leaflets in a dingy basement room, and four other
Russian-born Bolshevik-sympathizing comrades, who had helped
Abrams chuck the leaflets out the window, were convicted under
the Espionage Act for conspiring and attempting to disrupt the
war effort.' 3 Justice Holmes, Justice Brandeis concurring in the
opinion, dissented from the majority's affirmance of Abrams' conviction, saying:
I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that
would justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United
States constitutionally may punish speech that produces
...
a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about
the United States
forthwith certain substantive evils that
14
constitutionally may seek to prevent.
16Although it is hard to see any "clear and present danger," Debs hardly
could have complained about being convicted for obstructing the war effort, for
during the course of the trial he addressed the jury and said, "I have been
accused of obstructing the war. I admit it." Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211,
at 214 (1919).
250 U.S. 616 (1919).
12 Chafee, op. cit. supra note 4, at 109.
13For a thorough discussion of the Abrams case (events leading up to case,
the trial, etc.) see Chafee, op. cit. supra note 4, at 108-140.
14250 U.S. 616, at 627 (1919).
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but, Justice Holmes continued,
nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of
a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would
present any immediate danger that its opiions would hinder
the success of the government arms or have any appreciable
tendency to do so.15
...

The clear and present danger test begins to take on meaning.
Holmes says that it is only "certain" substantive evils the clear
and present danger of which will justify abridgment of speech.
That the evil contemplated by Holmes was more than a trivial or
insubstantial one is suggested by his statement that the expression
of opinion should be checked only if such expression "imminently
threatens immediate interference with the lawful and pressing
purposes of the law."' 6 "Present" is equated with "imminent";
speech may be punished only if there is danger that it will bring
about "forthwith" the substantive evil.
It is only the present danger of immediate evil... that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of
opinion ... 17
Holmes' opinion is important not only because it begins to
explain and to give meaning and substance to the clear and
present danger test, but also because it contains a justification of
freedom of speech. Indeed, the justification transcends the test
itself. For the justification of free speech should be the polestar
for determining the limits of its exercise.
...when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas,-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market; and
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our
Constitution. 18
It was his belief that "the ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas" that led Holmes to formulate a test that
15bid., at 628.
16 Ibid. (italics added).
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., at 680.
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would give the widest possible latitude to those who wished to
get their ideas "accepted in the competition of the market."
In two 1920 decisions, Schaefer v. United States0 and Pierce
v. United States,20 the majority of the Court upheld convictions
under the Espionage Act, ignoring the clear and present danger
test. But Justice Brandeis, Justice Holmes concurring, kept the
test alive in two dissenting opinions. In the Pierce case Justice
Brandeis merely stated that the test applied and that no clear
and present danger of any obstruction of the war effort had been
shown. In the Schaefer case the Court upheld the conviction of
Schaefer and five others for publishing and disseminating a German-language newspaper which carried reports so obviously false
and biased that they resembled "many reprints from the press of
Germany to which our patriotic societies gave circulation in order
to arouse the American fighting spirit."2 Said Justice Brandeis:
The test to be applied ... is not the remote or possible
effect. There must be clear and present danger. Certainly
men judging in calmness and with this test presented to
them could not reasonably have said that this coarse and
immediately threatened the success of reheavy humor
22
cruiting.
The last word Justice Holmes had to say on clear and present
danger was in his dissenting opinion in the 1925 case of Gitlow v.
New York.23 In 1919 the Left Wing of the Socialist Party broke
away from the parent body with the publication of a "Left Wing
Manifesto," printed at New York City in the "Revolutionary Age,"
the official organ of the Left Wing, of which Gitlow was business
manager. Gitlow was convicted under a theretofore dead-letter
statute punishing any advocacy of criminal anarchy, which was
defined as "the doctrine that organized government should be
overthrown by force or violence.., or by any unlawful means."
The "criminally anarchical" manifesto consisted of twenty pages
of somniferous type relating the recent events of history, then
fourteen pages more about destroying the parliamentary state,
with repeated exhortations to "mass strikes," "mass action," "ex19251 U.S. 466 (1920).
20 252 U.S. 239 (1920).
2

1

Justice Brandeis dissenting opinion, 251 U.S. 466, at 486 (1920).

22 Ibid.
23

268 U.S. 652 (1925). This case is discussed further in Part II, infra.
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propriation of the bourgeoisie," finally ending by prophesying "a
revolutionary struggle against Capitalism" that might last ten
years before the "final act of conquest of power." 4
Any agitator who read these thirty-four pages to a mob
would not stir them to violence, except possibly against
himself. This Manifesto would disperse them faster than the
riot act. It is best described by recalling the Mouse in "Alice
in Wonderland" reading about the Norman Conquest to
dry off the Dodo and the Lory. "'Ahem.' said the Mouse
with an important air, 'are you all ready? This is the driest
thing I know."- 25
Holmes and Brandeis respectfully dissented from the majority's
solemn affirmance, Justice Holmes stating that the clear and
present danger test, which had been sanctioned by the full Court
in the Schenck case, was the proper criterion to apply."' And, he
said,
If what I think the correct test is applied it is manifest that
there was no present danger of an attempt to overthrow the
government by force on the part of the admittedly small
minority who shared the defendant's views . . . whatever

us it had
may be thought of the redundant discourse before
27
no chance of starting a present conflagration.
Justice Holmes obviously had read the manifesto.
But it remained for Mr. Justice Brandeis to spell out in greater
detail the meaning of the clear and present danger test and, in so
doing, to provide a meaningful justification of freedom of speech.
28 in which Justice
His concurring opinion in Whitney v. California,
Holmes joined, is potentially more significant than any of the
previous free speech opinions.
Miss Anita Whitney was a well-meaning philanthropic woman
nearing sixty when she, a temporary member of the new Communist Labor Party, attended the party convention in Oaldand,
California. There she supported a resolution that the new party
should aim to capture power through the ballot. The convention
voted the resolution down, however, and adopted one which
urged the seizure of power by revolutionary industrial unionism
24

Chafee, op. cit. supra note 4, at 318-19.

25 Ibid., at 319.

26 268 U.S. 652, at 672.
27 Ibid., at 678.

28274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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and strikes.2 She thereby ran afoul of the California criminal
syndicalism statute, which made it a felony to assist in organizing
any group advocating criminal syndicalism. Because the constitutional issue had not been properly presented at the trial to bring
the case within the Supreme Court's limited power of review in
state criminal cases, Justices Brandeis and Holmes felt obligated
to sustain the conviction. But Justice Brandeis' disagreement with
the majority's reasoning on freedom of speech brought forth the
single most important opinion ever written regarding the clear
and present danger test.
He tells us that it is not every evil that will justify repression
of speech regardless of how clear and present may be the danger
of its occurrence.
The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or
destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be probability of serious injury to the
state.3 0
And at another point he says:
Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to
prohibition of these functions essential to effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious.
Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so
stringent that it would be inappropriate as31 the means for
averting a relatively trivial harm to society.
Justice Brandeis did not stop with the explicit recognition of
the necessity of seriousness in addition to clarity and immediacy.
It had been plain from the previous opinions of Holmes and
Brandeis that under the clear and present danger test the danger
had to be imminent, rather than remote, to justify suppression. It
is easy enough to understand why such a danger must be "clear."
But why is it necessary that it be "present"? If Congress (or a
state legislature) has the right and duty to guard against dangers
of serious public evils, why must it wait until the danger is imminent? Why may it not repress speech to avert the dangers of
the future? It is in his answer to these questions that Justice
Brandeis surpasses even Holmes in defending and justifying freedom of speech.
20 Chafee, op. cit. supra note 4, at 343-45.

80 274 U.S. 857, at 377 (italics added).

31 Ibid.
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Those who won our independence by revolution were not
cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not
exhalt order at the cost of liberty. To courageous, selfreliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed
clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is
opportunity for free discussion. If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied
is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency
can justify suppression. Such must be the rule if authority
is to be reconciled with freedom.32 Such, in my opinion, is
the command of the Constitution.
Let us be sure we understand. What are the essential features
of the "emergency" which alone will justify suppression of speech?
A situation in which there is no "opportunity for free discussion,"
in which there is no "time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education."
There is no emergency where the specific ideas will be given full
and partisan airing in the public forum. But where no such
presentation can or will take place, the clear and present danger
test would seem to be peculiarly inappropriate.
In attempting to determine just what the clear and present
danger test meant to its formulators, Holmes and Brandeis, perhaps the following observations will cast further light on the inquiry.
In every case in which Holmes and Brandeis used the test,
the restriction was upon the idea embodied in the speech and not
upon the time; the manner, or the place of speaking; in short, the
restriction was upon content rather than form. Schenck, Abrams,
Pierce, Schaefer, Gitlow, and Miss Whitney all were punished because of what they spoke, not because of when, or where, or how
they spoke. It has been suggested that Holmes drew a distinction
between restrictions on the mind and regulations of modes of
expression. That only where the restrictions of the state were
aimed at an idea itself did Holmes employ the clear and present
danger test, but that when the state action "was not calculated to
32

Ibid.
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suppress ideas, but merely to regulate the time, place, or manner
of expressing them, Mr. Justice Holmes' guide was the less stringent reasonable basis rule."33 For example, in Meyer v. NebraskaU
Holmes found nothing wrong in a state statute which prohibited
the teaching of foreign languages in the first eight grades of the
secondary schools. There was no repression of ideas, only a restriction on the mode of speaking.35 Holmes found a reasonable
basis for the statute in the desirability "that all citizens of the
United States should speak a common tongue." And Professor
Mendelson has uncovered two decisions3 6 rendered by Holmes
while on the Massachusetts Supreme Court bench in which he
applied in substance a reasonable basis rule to restrictions upon
the manner and place of expressing opinions.
Another point to note is that Holmes and Brandeis never
employed the test to determine the constitutionality of the statute
itself; in every case the test was used to determine whether the
statute had been constitutionally applied-their position being
that a statute used to abridge speech could be validly applied
only to those speeches and publications which in fact created a
clear and present danger to the security of the state.3 7 Of course,
Holmes and Brandeis would not have hesitated to strike down a
statute which arbitrarily and without basis abridged freedom of
speech. But in doing so they would not, so far as appears from
their opinions, have applied the test of clear and present danger.
These observations become significant when we later find a
liberal Court using the clear and present danger test both to
strike down restrictions upon the mode of expressing ideas 8s and
as a standard by which to measure the validity of statutes per se.3 9
33 Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-FromSchenck to Dennis, 52 Col. L.
Rev. 818, 816 (1952).
34262 U.S. 890 (1928).
35 Prohibiting teachers' speech in a foreign language "represses no ideas,
blocks no one's participation in democratic politics, and forecloses no efforts to
change the public mind." Mendelson, op. cit. supra note 88, at 316.
31 McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1891); Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 89 N.E. 118 (1895).
37See Cushman, op. cit. supra note 6, at 814-16, where this position is developed. See also Mendelson, op. cit. supra note 88, at 815: In origin 'clear and
present danger' was a rule of evidence designed to keep the appliationof espionand criminal syndicalism statutes within constitutional bounds. (Italics added)
e38 102e.g.,
Thornhill v. Alabama, 810 U.S. 88 (1940); Carlson v. California,
(1940).
810 U.S.
3a
e.g., West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624
(1948); ThornhiUl v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); see Part III, infra.
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But the most telling and lasting point made by Justices Holmes
and Brandeis was that our form of society is based upon free and
full public discussion of public issues; that the purpose of the
First Amendment is to protect the right of men to get their ideas
accepted in the market place of thought and, even more important, to protect the right of men to hear those ideas and issues
partisanly discussed in the public forum; that the ultimate safeguard of democracy is public discussion; and that "the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas."
II. THE MAJORITY OF THE COURT MAKE A
DISTINCTION AND NARROW THE SCOPE OF THE TEST
-BUT AT THE SAME TIME MAKE A FATAL SLIP
It will be remembered that the majority of the Court sustained
convictions in the Abrams, Schaefer, and Pierce cases over the
protest of Justices Holmes and Brandeis that the clear and present
danger test had not been met. The majority sedulously avoided
any reference whatever to "clear and present danger." They did
not repudiate the test; they simply ignored it.
By the time the Gitlow case reached the Court in 1925, however, the clear and present danger test had received considerable
publicity and widespread approval and could no longer be
ignored. To have accepted and applied the clear and present
danger test here would have meant a reversal and freedom for
radical Socialist Gitlow, since it was obvious that there was no
clear and present danger of anything, save boredom, from Gitlow's
redundant "Manifesto." But it seems the majority wanted the
conviction to stick. Since they could not ignore the test, and since
outright repudiation of the test would not only have been highly
unpopular but also would have entailed the overruling of the
unanimous Schenck decision, the majority took the only other
alternative available. They "distinguished" the Gitlow case and
thereby distinguished the test practically out of existence.
The Court declared that where a statute made certain acts or
conduct criminal, and a person was prosecuted on the theory that
his speeches or publications amounted to such criminal acts, then
in such case the qtestion was whether what had been said or published constituted a clear and present danger of bringing about
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the prohibited acts.40 No statute, the Court pointed out, prohibited the publication of the circulars which Schenck had mailed
out. Schenck had been indicted for violating a statute which
forbade obstruction of the draft, and his conviction had been
sustained because the circular which he published created a clear
and present danger that the draft would be obstructed. A wholly
different situation, the Court explained, was presented by a
statute, such as the one then before the Court, which forbade
certain language deemed by the legislature to be dangerous.
"That determination must be given great weight. Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the statute."41 Only if the
statute was an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the state's
police power could it be declared unconstitutional.
And according to the Court it was entirely reasonable for the state of
New York to seek to prevent the forcible overthrow of its government by punishing language advocating such overthrow.4 3 The
statute, then, was constitutional, and
...

when the legislative body has determined generally, in

the constitutional exercise of its discretion, that utterances
of a certain kind involve such danger of substantive evil
that they may be punished, the question whether any specific utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely,
in and of itself, to bring about the substantive evil, is not
open to consideration. It is sufficient that the statute itself
be constitutional and44that the use of the language comes
within its prohibition.
No one could deny that Gitlow's Manifesto came within the prohibition of the statute. Conviction affirmed. As one writer has put
it, "Gitlow was convicted because he published, not dangerous
words, but forbidden words." 45
It will be perceived that the distinction which the Court was
making left legislatures comparatively free to suppress unpopular
or unorthodox ideas by the mere act of forbidding their expres40268 U.S. 652, at 670-1 (1925).
41 Ibid., at 668.
42 Ibid., at 668-9. It will be recalled that the test of state statutes under the
"substantive" due process concept was "reasonableness." See generally, Kelly &
Harbison, The American Constitution, Chapters 19 & 20 (rev. ed. 1955).
43 268 U.S. 652, at 669.
44 Ibid., at 670.
45 Cushman, op. cit. supra note 6, at 318.
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sion.4 While the distinction stood "clear and present danger"
could be little more than an innocuous phrase.
But the Court, happily, made one mistake. They supported
the distinction they made on the basis of the presumption of constitutionality accorded to legislative enactments. And, if we may
plagiarize from a political saying, "as the presumption goes, so
goes the distinction." That the presumption, at least as to restrictions on freedom of speech and press, might one day go was
presaged by that single revolutionary sentence for which the
Gitlow case is famous. Only three years before, the Supreme
Court had unequivocally stated that "the Constitution of the
United States imposes on the States no obligation to confer upon
those within their jurisdiction... the right of free speech."47 But
in 1925 the Court was saying:
...we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of
the press-which are protected by the First Amendment
from abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental
personal rights and "liberties" protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by
48
the states ....
It was, perhaps, a little ironical that a later Court was to say
that if freedom of speech and press are "fundamental" personal
rights, as the majority in Gitlow had said they were, then they
occupied a "preferred position" in our scheme of constitutional
values and, hence, any statute which restricted those fundamental
rights would not be presumed to be constitutional.
But that development did not come quickly or all at once.
And the clear and present danger test was to remain dormant
for over a decade.
II. A LIBERAL COURT REVIVES THE TEST AND
EXTENDS ITS APPLICATION-HEREIN OF THE
"PREFERRED POSITION" THEORY
The period roughly from 1940 to 1950 was characterized, if
not by wholehearted and unanimous libertarianism, by a fairly
46
"Thus the protection of the clear and present danger doctrine was whittled
down to a narrow coverage, and the legislatures were left comparatively free to
punish thought and speech which they adjudged dangerous.' Pritchett, The
Roosevelt Court, at 275 (1948).
47PrudentialIns. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, at 538 (1922).
48 Gitlow v. United States, 268 U.S. 652, at 666 (1925).

"CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER" TEST

consistent determination to protect civil liberties. 49 It was this
new and marked attitude to protect civil liberties that led the
Court to cast about for some constitutional guidepost which would
serve the purpose. They found it in the clear and present danger
test.
Concurrent with the resuscitation of the Holmes-Brandeis
creation was the emergence of the "preferred position" theory of
First Amendment freedoms, both manifestations of the same judicial attitude. Certainly by the late thirties the Court had embraced the Holmes view that the Supreme Court justices should
not substitute their own economic opinions for those of the legislature. Accordingly a strong presumption of constitutionality was
accorded to statutes affecting economic matters. But beginning
with that famous footnote which Justice Stone appended to an
otherwise unimportant opinion, 50 the Court indicated that laws
abridging the four guarantees of civil liberty in the First Amendment, freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly, would not
be accorded a presumption of constitutionality-because the First
Amendment freedoms occupied a preferredposition in our scheme
of constitutional values. What Justice Stone said was this:
There may be narrower scope for the operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears
on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced
within the Fourteenth. 5 '
Which of the specific prohibitions of the first ten amendments
were "embraced within the Fourteenth"? The Gitlow case had
said that freedom of speech and press were so embraced. In
Palko v. Connecticut 52 the Court, speaking through Justice Cardozo, who as usual was in fine literary form, held that the Fourteenth Amendment embraced those rights which are "implicit in
49
See Kelly & Harbison, The American Constitution, Chapter 29 (rev. ed.
1955). This is not to imply that civil liberties went unprotected during the
thirties. There were many decisions protecting civil liberties. See Assoc. Press v.
N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 103 (1937); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Hamilton v. U. of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359 (1931); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939)- Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931); Lovell v. Griffen, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Schneider v. Irvington, 308
U.S. 147 (1939). The point is that there was a more marked attitude on the
part of the Court during the forties.
NO United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1988).
52 02 U.S. 319 (1937).
51 Ibid., at 152 n. 4.
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the concept of ordered liberty." 3 These, said the Court, were
freedom of speech, press, religion and assembly."4 And in order
to justify legislative restrictions upon these preferred, fundamental
rights, the Court demanded a clear showing of a clear and present
danger to the security or welfare of the state or nation.
This use of the clear and present danger test was not a
perversion of its author's philosophy. Holmes had recognized
that the Constitution had not enacted Herbert Spencer's "Social
Statics1154a nor any other particular economic theory, but he also
recognized that the Constitution had enacted the theory that freedom of speech, press, religion and assembly are essential to a
democratic society.
These enduring liberties

.

. .

were . . . specifically en-

shrined in the Bill Of Rights... Because these civil liberties
were explicitly safeguarded in the Constitution, or conceived to be basic to any notion of the liberty guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Justice Holmes was
far more ready to find legislative invasion in this field than
in the area of debatable economic reform. 55
Perhaps the best judicial statement illustrating the preferred
position theory and the relation to it of the clear and present
danger test is Justice Rutledge's opinion in Thomas v. Collirs.56
The case confronts us again with the duty our
system places on this Court to say where the individual's
freedom ends and the State's power begins. Choice on that
border, now as always delicate, is perhaps more so where
the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by
the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment. That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions...
53 Ibid., at 825.
54 Justice Cardozo also mentioned the right of one accused of crime to the
benefit of counsel, citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). But beginning
with Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), a majority of the Court, against vigorous
dissent, have adhered to the rule that the right to counsel is not incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Heller, The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: A Study in Constitutional Development, Chapter 6
(1951).
54a See Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905). "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics..
"
55 Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court 51 (1938).
56 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
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For these reasons any attempt to restrict those
liberties must be justified by clear public interest, threatened
not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger.
The rational connection between the remedy provided and
the evil to be curbed, which in other contexts might support legislation against attack on due process grounds, will
7
not suffice. These rights rest on a firmer foundation.5
Justice Jackson spelled out the same relationship in West Virginia
State Board of Educationv. Barnette:"'
The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth
Amendment, because it also collides with the First, is much
more definite than the test when only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due process clause
disappears when the specific prohibitions of the First become its standard. The right of a State to regulate, for
example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due
process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a "rational basis" for
adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly,
and of worship may not be infringed on such slender
grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent
grave and immediate danger to interests which the State
may lawfully protect. 59
From 1940 through 1949 there were numerous decisions which
specifically referred to the First Amendment freedoms as being
in a "preferred position."' 03 The same theory was expressed in different words in many other cases. 1 In the 1949 case of Kovacs v.
Coopel,12 Justice Reed, in the course of an opinion upholding a
Trenton, New Jersey, ordinance prohibiting the use on city streets
of sound trucks which emitted 'loud and raucous noises," referred
to the "preferred position" of freedom of speech, 3 although he
at 529-30.
Gs319 U.S. 624, at 639 (1943).
59Ibid.
60 lones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 600, 608 (1942) (dissenting opinion),
adopted per curiam on rehearing, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943); Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944); Follett v.
Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 575 (1944); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,
509 (1946); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
57Ibid.,

U.S. 77, 88 (1949).
61 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940); Bridges v. California, 314

U.S. 252, 262 (1941); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 639 (1943); Thomas v. Collins, 828 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); United States
v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106, 140 (1948). See Comment, 40 Col. L. Rev. 531 (1940).
6 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
63 Ibid., at 88.
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exhibited no particular preference for that freedom in his decision. This reference brought forth a petulant outburst from
Justice Frankfurter.
My brother Reed speaks of "The preferred position of freedom of speech" . . . I deem it a mischievous phrase, if it
carries the thought, which it may subtly imply, that any law
touching communication is infected with presumptive invalidity . . . I say the phrase is mischievous because it
radiates a constitutional doctrine without avowing it.6
There follows a chronological account of the evolution of talk
about "preferred position" from the Carolene footnote to Justice
Reed's garrulity in the Kovacs opinion. Frankfurter then concluded:
In short, the claim that any legislation is presumptively unconstitutional which touches the field of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment, insofar as the latter's
concept of "liberty" contains what is specifically protected
by the First, has never commended itself to a majority of
this Court. 65
Although we may disagree with his analysis of the past, we must
commend Frankfurter's determination, for after 1949 his position
became dominant (due in no small measure to the deaths of those
two preferred position adherents, Murphy and Rutledge), "and
the Court no longer accorded freedom of speech, press, and assembly any preferred position, but instead balanced the guarantees in question against the wisdom and reasonableness of the
social regulation in question." 66
But while "preferred position" prevailed, "clear and present
danger" became the polestar for determining permissible civil
liberties infringements in a host of diverse situations involving
freedom of speech,67 press,6 8 and religion. 69 Violent and abusive
65 Ibid., at 94-5.
66 Kelly & Harbison, The American Constitution, at 793 (rev. ed. 1955).
67 Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1940); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 68
1 (1949).
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331 (1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Taylor v. Mississippi,
583 (1943); Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944).
319 U.S.
69
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). So far as the writer has been able
to find the clear_ and present danger test has never been applied to freedom of
assembly cases.
64 Ibid., at 90.
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newspaper editorials criticizing court or judge were held to constitute contempt of court only if they constituted a clear and
present danger of serious interference with the fair and orderly
administration of justice. 0 Children were permitted to refuse to
salute the flag unless there was a clear and present danger of
serious harm to society 7' (the possibility of a lonely pig-tailed girl
of nine causing serious harm to society by her refusal to stiff-arm
the flag is indeed hard to imagine). Jehovah's Witnesses could
peddle literature urging and advising their fellow-citizens to refrain from saluting the flag so long as their communications did
not threaten any "clear and present danger to our institutions or
our Government."72 Picketing workers could wave large signs
reading "Don't be a Scab" in the absence of "clear and present
danger of substantive evils." 73 A Jehovah's Witness could walk
along the public sidewalks in New Haven, Connecticut, in a
Roman Catholic neighborhood playing anti-Roman Catholic records on a portable phonograph. Only "clear and present menace
to public peace and order" could silence the attack on the Holy
Mother. 74 The Government could not deport the alien Harry
Bridges on the ground that he had been a communist in the
absence of proof "that his presence constitutes a clear and present
danger to the public welfare." 75 And so on.
During this new era of civil liberties there was surprisingly
little amplification by the Court of the meaning of the clear and
present danger test as it had been formulated by Holmes and
Brandeis; the Court merely repeated the Schenck rubric over and
over again.76 But if there was little amplification, it is equally
true that there was no change in essential meaning either. The
decisions showed that the terms of the test meant what Holmes
and Brandeis had said or implied that they meant.
70 Craigv. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida,328 U.S. 331
(1946); Bridges v. California,314 U.S. 252 (1941).
71 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
72 Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943).

73 Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940).
74 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
7•
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
7
6 See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1942); Korematsu v.

United States, 323

U.S. 214, 233 (1944); see also all cases cited in notes 67, 68,
and 69. Clear and present danger was also referred to in United States v. C.I.O.,
335 U.S. 106, 129 (1948); U.P.W. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 105, 115 (1947);
Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 98 (1948); Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680
(1944).
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From its use in the decisions, the word "clear" implied that
there must be a direct causal relation between the speech and
the danger of the occurrence of a substantive evil. That is, that
the speech, if not repressed, would clearly cause or bring about
a danger that the substantive evil would occur. 71 Thomas v. Collins had held that to warrant interference with speech "the public
interest must be threatened not doubtfully or remotely."71 As one
student of the period has put it:
The test further requires that the supposed danger be
"clear"-that is, there must be a reasonable expectation that
79
the harmful consequences prohibited by law will ensue.
The Court made it abundantly clear that "present" meant
that the danger had to be immediate, imminent before suppression would be justified. As Justice Black put it:
What finally emerges from the "clear and present danger"
cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must
be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high before utterances can be punished.8 0
The cases, with one or two aberrations, 8 ' adhered to the
Brandeis position that the "substantive evil" referred to in the
test was a serious one.
interests,
Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
82
give occasion for permissible limitation.
As Justice Douglas forthrightly said:
...

freedom of speech, though not absolute.., is neverthe-

less protected against censorship or punishment, unless
shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a
serious substantive evil that rises far above public incon83
venience, annoyance, or unrest.

77 See Antieau, "Clear and Present Danger"-Its Meaning and Significance, 25
Notre Dame Lawyer 603 (1950), 39 Cal. L. Rev. 475, at 480 (1951).
78323 U.S. 516, at 530 (1945).
79 Fraenkel, Our Civil Liberties 68 (1944).
80 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, at 263 (1941) (italics added). See
Antieau,
81 op. cit. supra note 77, at 605-6. 310 U.S. 296, at 308 (1940), bad inDicta in Cantwell v. Connecticut,
timated that even a minor breach of the peace might constitute a substantive evil.
82 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, at 530 (1945).
83 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, at 4 (1949); see Antieau, op. cit. supra
note 77, at 607-13, for an exhaustive treatment of what amounts to a 'substantive
evil."
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Unfortunately there was little articulation or discussion of the
purpose free speech is supposed to serve in a democracy. None
of the Justices went into the underlying, fundamental purpose
of the First Amendment; nor did any explore and attempt to ex-4
plain the reason for applying the clear and present danger test.
It is interesting to note three developments during this period.
First, the clear and present danger test came to be employed
where the restriction was not upon any particular ideas or doctrines but merely upon the manner or place of expression.8a That
is, "clear and present danger" became the test for restrictions
upon the form as well as the content of expression. Second, the
clear and present danger test became the standard, not only to
determine whether admittedly valid statutes had been constitutionally applied, but also to measure the constitutionality of
statutes per see.sa The third development was Justice Frankfurter's growing dissatisfaction with the test as a trustworthy
guide to specific decisions. His first attack on the test came in
1941.
The Constitution... is not a formulary ... Nor does it
require displacement of an historic test (the "reasonable
tendency" test) by a phrase which first gained currency on
March 3, 1919.86
In 1943, he accused the majority of using the clear and present
danger test in situations for which it was never intended.
To talk about "clear and present danger" as the touchstone
of allowable educational policy by the states whenever
school curricula may impinge upon the boundaries of individual conscience, is to take a felicitous phrase out of the
situation where it arose and for
context of the particular
8 7
which it was adapted.

84The closest thing to an explanation came from Justice Murphy, who was
obviously rephrasing Justice Brandeis' initial formulation: "Abridgment of the
liberty of . . . discussion can be justified only where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits
of ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of public opinion." ThornhiIl
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, at 104-5 (1940).
85 Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940) (picketing); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (picketing); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)
(soliciting union membership); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (encouragng breach of the peace).
85a Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (city ordinance); Thornhill v.
Alabama 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (state statute); Carlson v. California,310 U.S. 106
(1940) (county ordinance); see Cushman, op. cit. supra note 6, at 318-24.
86 Dissenting opinion in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, at 295 (1941).
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The attack was resumed in 1946.
It does an ill-service to the author of the most quoted
judicial phrases regarding freedom of speech, to make him
the victim of a tendency which he fought all his life, whereby phrases are made to do service for critical analysis by
being turned into dogma... "clear and present danger" was
never used by Mr. Justice Holmes to express a technical
legal doctrine or to convey a formula for adjudicating cases.
It was a literary phrase not to be distorted by being taken
from its context. In its setting it served to indicate the importance of freedom of speech to a free society but also to
emphasize that its exercise must be compatible with the
to a democracy
preservation of other freedoms essential
and guaranteed by our Constitution.88
In a bitter dissent in 1947 Frankfurter complained that "clear
and present danger" had become
... merely a phrase for covering up a novel, iron constitutional doctrine ... Only the pungent pen of Mr. justice
Holmes could adequately comment on such a perversion of
the purpose of his phrase.8 9

During the "libertarian era" the pen of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
had little effect on his brother justices. But the "libertarian era"
could not last forever.
IV. THE JUSTICES DASH OFF IN ALL DIRECTIONS AND
LEAVE THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE TEST A MATTER
OF CONJECTURE
The division of the larger part of the world into two hostile
and equally powerful camps, Communist and anti-Communist,
and the admitted infiltration of Communists into government,
labor unions, and the like, gave rise in the late forties to fear
and uncertainty and tended to impose a sense of conservative
conformity upon American politics and national life. The attitude of the Court, quite naturally perhaps, began to reflect
something of this atmosphere of crisis and conservatism."' The
87
Dissenting opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
819 U.S. 624, at 663 (1943).
88Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, at 352-3 (1946).
89 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, at 891 (1947).
9
0 See Kelly & Iarbison, The American Constitution, Chapter 31 (rev. ed.
1955).
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attitude of the Court changed from a determination to protect
civil liberties to a determination to maintain national security.
That this attitude would have a marked effect upon the clear and
present danger test was as certain as was the passage of time. As
some libertarian wag might put it-our First Amendment freedoms moved from a "preferred" to a "deferred" position, their
protection being deferred to some future time, less critical and
less emotion-packed.
The first indication that the Court regarded the clear and
present danger test as a pretty poor weapon for the protection of
national security came in the case of American Communications
Association v. Douds. 11 The Taft-Hartley Labor Relations Act of
1947 provided that labor union officers were required to sign nonCommunist affidavits as a prerequisite to that union's use of the
services of the National Labor Relations Board. In other words,
if you believed in Communism you could either get out of the
union or lie and keep quiet. Even Chief Justice Vinson, writing
for the majority, had to admit that "Congress has undeniably discouraged the lawful exercise of political freedoms." 92 The substantive evil which Congress was seeking to prevent, said Vinson,
was "political strikes." Was there a clear and present danger that
disruptive "political strikes" would occur if union officers were
permitted to freely express their belief in Commumism? Immaterial, said Vinson.
...the question with which we are here faced is not the
same one that Justices Holmes and Brandeis found convenient to consider in terms of clear and present danger.
93

The Act, said Vinson, "does not interfere with speech because
Congress fears the consequences of speech"; this was a commercial
regulation, a valid exercise of the commerce power. Then, a
harbinger of things to come:
When the effect of a statute or ordinance upon the exercise
of First Amendment freedoms is relatively small and the
public interest to be protected is substantial, it is obvious
that a rigid test requiring a showing of imminent
danger
94
to the security of the Nation is an absurdity.
913,39 U.S. 382 (1950).
92

Ibid., at 393.

93 Ibid., at 396.

94

Ibid., at 397.
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The Court had managed to side-step "clear and present
danger" for the time being, but it soon had to face the same question which Justices Holmes and Brandeis had "found convenient
to consider in terms of clear and present danger."
The Smith Act of 1940 made it unlawful to "knowingly or
willingly advocate, abet, advise, or teach . . .overthrowing any
government in the United States by force or violence" or to
organize or help to organize any group advocating or encouraging such overthrowY. One section forbade conspiracies to commit any of the acts forbidden by the law. In July 1948, the Department of Justice procured the indictment of eleven principal
officers of the Communist Party on a charge of violating the Smith
Act, the indictment charging that the defendants had conspired
to form groups advocating the forcible overthrow of the government and had conspired to advocate and teach the same doctrines.
The defendants were convicted in a celebrated trial in New York
City before Judge Harold Medina; the Court of Appeals, speaking
through Judge Learned Hand, sustained the conviction." The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, but limited review substantially
to the question whether the Smith Act, inherently or as applied,
violated the First Amendment. Dennis v. United States" was
about to make constitutional history.
Whether the "substantive evil" which Congress was seeking
to prevent be regarded as the forcible overthrow of the government or, as the Court regarded it, an attempt at such overthrow,
any rigorous application of the clear and present danger test
would have required a holding that the Smith Act was unconstitutional or, at the very least, that it could not be constitutionally
applied to such activities with which the defendants had been
charged."
Chief Justice Vinson, in an opinion in which Justices Reed,
Burton and Minton joined, realized the dodging was over.
In this case we are squarely presented with the application
of the "clear and present danger" test, and must decide
what that phrase imports.99
05
18 U.S.C. See. 11 (1946).
9
6Dennis v. United States, 183 F. 2d 201 (2nd Cir. 1950).
97841 U.S. 494 (1951).
98
Indeed, at the argument before the Supreme Court the Solicitor General
of the United States admitted that traditional application of the clear and present
danger test would require reversal. 19 U.S.L. Week 3166 (1951).
941 U.S. 494, at 508 (1951).
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In 1951 that phrase imported new and different things indeed.
Chief Justice Vinson considered the nature of the Communist
menace and concluded that Holmes and Brandeis
...
were not confronted with any situation comparable to
the instant one-the development of an apparatus designed
and dedicated to the overthrow of the government, in the
context of world crisis after crisis.100

Under mid-twentieth century conditions, Vinson thought that
Judge Learned Hand's "interpretation" of the phrase was the
proper one:
In each case (courts) must ask whether the gravity of the
'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion
of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.10 1
Since here the "evil", the attempt to overthrow the government
by force and violence, was about as "grave" an evil, short of actual
overthrow, as one could imagine, the probability of its occurrence
needed to be very slight (and it was very slight indeed in the
present case) to justify an invasion of free speech to avoid the
danger. Under the new interpretation the Communists could of
course be silenced. °2
The new "interpretation" was, of course, a different test from
the traditional "clear and present danger" test. Under the latter
test, as it had evolved from decision to decision, there was a body
of "serious" evils, any one of which would justify suppression of
speech only if the danger of its occurrence as a result of the speech
was both "clear" and "present". Nothing in the decisions applying
the clear and present danger test ever suggested that the danger
needed to be any less clear or any less present for one evil than for
another. Regardless of the relative seriousness or gravity of the
evil involved, the required degree of clearness and immediacy
remained constant.
But if some evils are less serious than others why should they
be dealt with in the same manner as the more serious ones? Since
some evils less serious than the overthrow, or attempted overthrow, of the government by force and violence are concededly
of a sufficient seriousness to warrant the restriction of speech when
100 Ibid., at 510.

101 Ibid.
102 For a criticism of the Dennis case see Antieau, "Dennis v. United StatesPrecedent, Principle or Perversion?" 5 Vand. L. Rev. 141 (1952).
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the evil is "present", why should the same degree of immediacy
be required in a case involving the most serious evil to the nation?
Is it wise toapply mechanically a rigid test in all cases involving
attempted restrictions on expression in complete disregard of the
nature of the evil involved? It must have been such questions
which troubled Judge Learned Hand and caused him to reinterpret the traditional clear and present danger test in such a way
as to enable the judiciary to take into consideration the nature of
the evil involved.
What the new' interpretation amounted to was a "sliding
scale". On the one hand was a scale of evils arranged according
to their relative "gravity", the evils ranging from the most serious
to the least serious. On the other hand was a scale of probabilities
to the least serious. On the other hand was a scale of probabilities,
the probabilities ranging from very slight to very great. Where the
evil was very grave the probability of its occurrence needed to be
very slight. As one proceeded down the scale of evils, the evils becoming less grave, the probability of occurrence required in order
to justify suppression of free speech increased. For example, if the
interference with the administration of justice by the courts is an
evil less "grave" than, say, an attempt to overthrow the government, then the probability of the occurrence of such interference
would have to be greater than the probability of an attempt at
overthrow to justify such suppression of speech as would be
necessary to avoid the danger that such interference would take
place.
But is it wise to label some acts or conditions very "grave"
evils, and hence permit the suppression of speech which is calculated to bring about the "evils" on a mere showing that there
is some probability that the speech will produce them? Does
this not go a long way toward preventing the discussion of ideas
which, in the opinion of the courts, tend to cause "grave evils"?
Is this not an indirect way of passing on the wisdom of ideas?
When, as in America, men govern themselves, is it not they who
should pass upon the wisdom or unwisdom of ideas? Would not
such a test protect only those safe and orthodox ideas which
rarely need protection? Should we be denied the right to hear
the merits as well as the demerits of, say, euthanasia, because the
courts believe it to be a "grave evil" and that a persuasive presen-

"CLEA AND FR sr

DA rcxn" T.Esr

tation of its merits presents a sufficient degree of probability that
some practice of euthanasia will result?
The new interpretation is the product of a truly great mind,
and was undoubtedly formulated only after the most thoughtful
consideration. That there is logic in the new interpretation cannot be denied. But the question is not one of logic-it is one of
wisdom. And that question is a debatable one.
The new interpretation, however, was subscribed to by only
four of the Justices, three of whom, Vinson, Reed, and Minton,
are no longer on the Court. The other Justices had different
observations regarding the clear and present danger test.
Justice Frankfurter objected to the phrase "clear and present
danger" if by its use the Court would avoid the conscious weighing
of competing interests, a view he has been at pains to express on
10 3
other occasions.
It were far better that the phrase be abandoned than that
it be sounded once more to hide from the believers in an
absolute right of free speech the plain fact that the interest
in speech, profoundly important as it is, is no more conclusive in judicial review than other attributes of democracy
or than a determination of the people's representatives
that a measure
is necessary to assure the safety of govern10 4
ment itself.
The primary responsibility, said Frankfurter, in weighing the
competing interests in a democracy "of necessity belongs to the
Congress."'10 5 It was clear, however, that Frankfurter himself entertained a poor opinion of the Smith Act and accepted its constitutionality only under his rule of great deference to the legislative judgment. Frankfurter's philosophy of judicial review precludes a strict application of the clear and present danger test as
well as favored treatment for civil liberties.
Justice Jackson, unlike Vinson, Burton, Reed and Minton, did
not think it necessary to torture and twist the clear and present
danger test to fit the result desired-he simply found it inapplicable. "I think reason is lacking for applying that test to this
case."'' 0 Such a test, he said, is unsuited for a case involving a
103 See cases cited in notes 86-89.
104341 U.S. 494, at 544 (1951).
105 Ibid., at 525.
106341 U.S. 494, at 569 (1951).
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foreign-dominated conspiracy, a situation which requires the
Court to "appraise imponderables, including international and
national phenomena which baffle the best informed foreign offlees and our most experienced politicians." 0 7 The Court should
not be required to prophesy whether there was any clear and
present danger of an attempt to forcibly overthrow the government. "The judicial process simply is not adequate to a trial of
such far-flung issues. " -lus But Justice Jackson would by no means
have discarded the clear and present danger test.
I would save it, unmodified, for application as a "rule of
reason" in the kind of case for which it was devised. When
the issue is criminality of a hot-headed speech on a street
corner, or circulation of a few incendiary pamphlets, or
parading by some zealots behind a red flag, or refusal of a
handful of school children to salute our flag, it is not beyond
the capacity of the judicial process to gather, comprehend,
and weigh the necessary materials for decision whether it
is a clear and present danger of substantive evil or a harmless letting off of steam. 10 9
Justice Black, always a firm adherent to the clear and present
danger test, favored its application in the Dennis case, and observed:
...the other opinions in this case show that the only way
to affirm these convictions is to repudiate directly or indirectly the established "clear and present danger" rule.110
Justice Douglas, like Black, believed that where free speech
is involved, clear and present danger is the very least that should
justify suppression.
...free speech is the rule, not the exception. The restraint
to be constitutional must be based on more than fear, on
more than passionate opposition against the speech, on
more than a revolted dislike for its contents. There must
be some immediate injury to society that is likely if speech
is allowed."'
In America, said Douglas, the Communists are "miserable merchants of unwanted ideas." "How it can be said that there is a
107 Ibid., at 570.

108 Ibid.
109 Ibid., at 568.
110 Ibid., at 580.
11 Ibid., at 585.
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clear and present danger that this advocacy will succeed is . . .
2
a mystery.""
Justice Clark, who had been Attorney General at the time of
the institution of the proceedings against the Communist leaders,
took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
The Dennis opinions were the last pronouncements on "clear
and present danger."1 12 a It would be difficult to imagine more
diverse and confficting ones. Vinson, Reed, Jackson, and Minton
are gone. Clark did not speak. Warren, Harlan, Whittaker, and
Brennan have yet to speak. What is the present status of the clear
and present danger test? I do not pretend to know. It seems fair
to say that its future depends in large measure upon personal
philosophy, public opinion, international relations, and perhaps
even what the Justices have for breakfast. Your guess is as good
as mine.
V.

SOME OBSERVATIONS

It is submitted that it would be desirable in attempting to
determine the constitutional limits of free speech in our democracy to ask the question: What is the fundamental purpose of the
First Amendment? Or, more properly: What is the fundamental
purpose of free speech in a representative democracy where government is based upon the consent of the governed?
If the people are to govern, then the people must be enlightened. If the people are to decide the issues which confront
the nation, then the people should hear those issues partisanly
discussed in the public forum. If democracy ultimately depends
upon the choices of the people, and if the choices of the people
ultimately depend upon the ideas which prevail in the minds of
the people, then we must affirm that "the ultimate good desired
is better reached by free trade in ideas."
When men govern themselves, it is they-and no one else
-who must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness
and danger. And that means that unwise ideas must have a
hearing as well as wise ones, unfair as well as fair, dangerous as well as safe, un-American as well as American. Just
so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide an
112 Ibid., at 589.
112a Except for a reiteration of his Dennis views by Justice Jackson in Beauharnaisv. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 287, at 302-3 (1951).
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issue are denied acquaintance with information or opinion
or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that
issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good. It is that mutilation
of the thinking process of the community against which the

First Amendment to the Constitution'is directed. The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities
of the program of self-government. It is not a Law of
Nature or of Reason in the abstract. It is a deduction from
the basic American agreement1 3that public issues shall be
decided by universal suffrage.

If, then, the fundamental purpose of the First Amendment is
to insure, so far as possible, the enlightenment of the electorate,
should not a constitutional distinction be made between open and
secret speech?" 4 Between speech which is offered in the public
forum and that which is purposely designed to avoid the market
place of partisan, public discussion? In a democratic society is
there not a vital difference between the expression of ideas which
the hearer may, if he chooses, pass on and discuss with whomever
he pleases, and the expression of ideas which the bearer is either
113 Meildejohn, Free Speech And Its Relation to Self-Government, at 26-7
(1948).
"14 This distinction is not entirely an original one. See Comment, 53 Col. L.
Rev. 620 (1953); Comment, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 553 (1952). A further distinction
could perhaps be made between speech relating to public matters and speech
touching upon purely private matters. See Meiklejohn, op. cit. supra note 113.
For a trenchant criticism of Meiklejohn's book and of making any distinction
between public and private speech, see Chafee, Book Review, 62 Harv. L. Rev.
891, esp. 899-901 (1949). In the Dennis case Justice Black seems to suggest some
such distinction. "At least as to speech in the realm of public matters, I believe
that the 'clear and present danger' test does not 'mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected expression' but does 'no more than recognize a
minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights."' 341 U.S. 494, at 580 (1951). Although the distinction is perhaps a valid one in view of the purpose of free speech
and the First Amendment, it does not seem as fundamental as the one here suggested. As for the distinction between open and secret speech consider the remarks of Mr. McGohey, counsel for the Government, made at the Dennis trial before Judge Medina: "When Holmes spoke about freedom of speech, he said he
meant the right of men to get their ideas accepted in the market place of thought.
Holmes was talking from the background of a life and an experience where there
was the freest possible discussion, in the town meetings of the New England, in
the public taverns, in the public squares, in the public halls, where men frankly
and fearlessly stated their ideas. He was not talking about the kind of propaganda
speakeasy that we heard about in this case, where person went to school under
assumed names or using only their first names, coming through a doctor's or a
dentist's office into rooms some place else. This is not the kind of freedom of
speech Holmes said could be protected." N.Y. Times, May 21, 1949, p. 6, col. 3;
quoted in Nathanson, The Communist Trial and the Clear and Present Danger
Test, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1167, at 1170 (1950); also quoted in Comment, 51 Mich.
L. Rev. 558, at 554 (1952).
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forbidden to transmit at all or is forbidden to transmit except to
a selected and similarly restricted few? Do not democratic processes suffer when ideas are designed to be, and are, kept from the
channels of free and open discussion? Is not enlightenment impossible without awareness?
The line between the open and the clandestine may not in all
cases be easy to draw. But that is not a sufficient reason for not
drawing the line at all. It should not be beyond the competence
of the judiciary to determine whether the purpose and effect of
speech was to bypass the democratic processes of partisan discussion and debate."' And the requirement of "open" speech
should be satisfied where no restrictions are placed upon the
transmission and dissemination of the ideas expressed other than
the value and worth of the ideas themselves and the enthusiasm
and desire of those who hear to discuss and pass them along.
And where the speech is of open, non-clandestine nature, should
it not be free from abridgment where there is both time and
opportunity to discuss and, if need be, to refute the ideas expressed before any evil can result from them? Where speech is
open should not "clear and present danger" be the very least we
require to justify its suppression?
It is beyond the competence and outside the purpose of this
writer to suggest the proper test to be applied to secret speech." 6
The purpose of these observations is merely to suggest that, in
view of the fundamental purpose of free speech in a representative
115 Compare the following statement of Judge Hand in Dennis v. United
States, 183 F. 2d 201, at 212 (1950): "The violent capture of all existing Qover___________V_
-

-.

- -

-1-ta ce, whicif is -a commnon-place
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ilty that the speech involved was of a
and parts of the oral charges given by
ise). See Nathanson, op. cit. supra note

-

~

'

>i'

71.
-

-
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democracy, clandestine speech is not entit
degree of constitutional protection which

accorded to open speech.
Author's note: As this article goes to press, the Su]
case which, like Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 4 ,
Act prosecutions and presented substantially the same
the Dennis case. Yates v. United States, 1 L. ed. 2d
makes no mention of the "clear and present danger"
that the present Court at least intends to discard it. I
ever, whether the test should be discarded.

